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I. Introduction
At the close of its 2014 Term, a five-to-four majority of the Supreme
Court held in Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. The In-
clusive Communities Project, Inc. (ICP)1 that disparate-impact claims are
cognizable under the Fair Housing Act (FHA).2 The specific legal chal-
lenge involved the claim that the State of Texas awarded tax credits
under the Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program3 dispropor-
tionately to affordable housing projects to be built in racially segregated,
economically distressed areas, and allocated far fewer tax credits to hous-
ing being developed in higher-resourced areas that afford access to im-
proved education and employment opportunities.4 This article addresses
Andrea McArdle (mcardle@law.cuny.edu) is Professor of Law at the City Univer-
sity of New York School of Law.
1. 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq.
3. 26 U.S.C. § 42 et seq.
4. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., at 15–18, Tex.
Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507
(2015).
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tensions and questions that remain in the wake of the Court’s highly con-
sequential opinion. Recognizing that the opinion focused on the broader
question whether Congress intended disparate-impact liability to be ac-
tionable under the Fair Housing Act, the article will consider the implica-
tions of the opinion for achieving racial justice as lower courts, housing
advocates, local governments, and private developers seek to apply the
Court’s precepts to specific contexts.
A key consideration in Part II will be the Court’s treatment of the legal
theory developed by the plaintiff, The Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.,
in ICP that promoting residential mobility to areas of greater opportunity
is integral to achieving the aims of the Fair Housing Act.5 This discussion
addresses the Court’s seeming struggle throughout the opinion between,
on the one hand, concerns to reduce the “salience of race” in social and
economic functioning,6 and, on the other, the importance of reducing
the degree of racial isolation7 that, in segregated neighborhoods, impairs
access to resources present in more racially and economically integrated
areas. It will show that although the Court ruled that disparate-impact li-
ability was actionable under the Fair Housing Act, it articulated a number
of limits on its ruling but offered limited guidance to those seeking to im-
plement the decision.
In Part III, the article will address related claims advanced in a recent
lawsuit, Winfield v. City of New York,8 a post-ICP challenge to a lottery, re-
ferred to in the complaint as an “outsider-restriction“ policy, that New
York City uses to screen applications for access to affordable housing.9
As developed in the complaint, the policy accords a preference for 50 per-
cent of units in an affordable housing project to the residents of the commu-
nity district in which the project is to be built. The complaint turns on the
theory that the outsider-restriction policy limits the ability of New York
City residents otherwise equally eligible for affordable housing to have
equal opportunity to be considered when applying for units located outside
their community district.10 It alleges that this restriction, in turn, impairs the
5. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 44–46.
6. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2524.
7. Id. at 2525.
8. Winfield v. City of New York, Case 1:15-cv-05236 (S.D.N.Y. filed July 7,
2015).
9. Id.
10. Id. New York City is divided into fifty-nine community districts across five
boroughs. These districts vary in area from less than 900 acres to almost 15,000
acres and in population from fewer than 35,000 residents to more than 200,000.
Each community district is represented by a local community board, constituted
by local law in 1975, which serves as a site of local governance and community
input. N.Y.C. Dep’t of City Planning, Community Portal, http://www.nyc.gov/
html/dcp/html/neigh_info/nhmap.shtml. Each board comprises up to fifty
members, who serve without salary. Half of the board members are nominated
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mobility that affords access to housing sited in higher opportunity districts
and constitutes disparate-impact as well as intentional discrimination
under both the Fair Housing Act and the city’s Human Rights Law.11
The article will examine the legal theory and background of the
Winfield complaint in relation to the Court’s signals in ICP concerning
the scope of disparate-impact liability under the FHA. It argues that the
facts pleaded in the Winfield case implicate core concerns animating the
drafters of the Fair Housing Act, which the Court in ICP recognized. Re-
lated to these mobility-to-opportunity concerns in the complaint, this part
will note recent research that centers on the significance of place, and in
particular opportunities for residential mobility, in improving the life cir-
cumstances of persons living in racially and economically segregated
neighborhoods.
The article concludes with some preliminary observations whether the
Court’s analysis in ICP affords support for this litigation-based effort to
pursue a vision of racial justice and inclusion in the provision of affordable
housing. In ICP, the analysis of disparate-impact liability was complicated
by the relevance of the community-revitalization provisions of the Low In-
come Housing Tax Credit program, which are not at issue in Winfield. Fur-
ther, unlike ICP, theWinfield case does not challenge the locations where af-
fordable housing is being built but rather the lack of equal access to
affordable housing opportunities on the basis of where applicants reside
in New York City. To the extent that the Court suggested that the particular
facts in the ICP case might not warrant a finding of disparate-impact liabil-
ity, these facts seem distinguishable from the policy challenged in Winfield.
II. The Tension in ICP: Reducing the Salience of Race versus
Concern for Perpetuating Racial Isolation
A. ICP’s Case Theory: Highlighting the Harms of Perpetuating Racially
Segregated Housing
This part offers a close reading of the Court’s interpretation of the Fair
Housing Act in ICP, arguing that the Court’s rationale reveals a tension at
the heart of the opinion between agreement with the pro-integration goal
of the Act and concern that implementing that goal would reinforce race-
based decision making. This tension complicates efforts at predicting how
the opinion will be applied in future cases. Understanding the source of
the tension, in turn, benefits from a consideration of the parties and the
underlying theory of the complaint.
by their district’s city council members and all board members are selected and ap-
pointed by the borough president. New York City community boards have a sig-
nificant advisory role in land use and zoning matters. NYC Mayor’s Community
Affairs Unit, About Community Boards, http://www.nyc.gov/html/cau/html/cb/
about.shtml.
11. New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107.
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A non-profit organization serving low-income African American families
in the Dallas metropolitan area, ICP’s mission is to assist these families who
qualify for the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher program to obtain rental
housing in predominantly Caucasian suburban neighborhoods.12 In this ac-
tion, ICP challenged the practices of the Texas Department of Housing and
Community Affairs (TDHCA), the state agency charged with allocating fed-
eral Low Income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTC) to finance the building of
affordable housing projects.13 The LIHTC statutory scheme sets eligibility re-
quirements for assigning credits and also confers on the states authority to
develop additional criteria for awarding credits. The statute contemplates
that developers that receive credits will be able to finance the building of
housing projects by selling the credits to investors.14
In its complaint, ICP alleged that the TDHCA allocated credits dispro-
portionately to projects located in predominately minority districts in the
Dallas metropolitan area rather than majority-Caucasian districts that of-
fered superior education and employment opportunities. The complaint
further alleged that this practice perpetuates residential segregation that
historically has deprived African Americans in this area from attaining
equal access to higher-opportunity areas and has relegated them to hous-
ing located in high-crime, environmentally degraded neighborhoods, in
violation of the disparate-impact provisions of the Fair Housing Act.15
After trial, the District Court for the Western District of Texas found
that ICP had demonstrated disparate impact under a burden-shifting ar-
rangement that placed the burden on defendant (TDHCA) to show both
that it had a substantial interest justifying its practice and that there
were no less intrusive alternatives to it. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit re-
versed and remanded, determining that the recently promulgated Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) standard shifting the
burden of demonstrating less intrusive alternatives to the plaintiff should
be applied.16 The TDHCA petitioned for certiorari, challenging an issue
that it preserved but had not argued below: whether the Fair Housing
Act made actionable a disparate-impact claim of discrimination.17
In the Supreme Court, the briefs of ICP18 and the Solicitor General19 sup-
ported a construction of the Fair Housing Act that reflected its broad
12. Brief for Plaintiff-Respondent at 18, Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v.
Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015).
13. Id. at 20, 23.
14. Id. at 20.
15. Id.
16. Inclusive Cmtys. Project v. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 747 F.3d
275, 281–82 (5th Cir. 2014).
17. Brief for Plaintiff-Respondent at 29–30, Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs
v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015).
18. Id. at 32–33, 42–47, 59–61.
19. Brief for U.S. Solicitor General as Amicus Curiae at 17–30.
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purpose and forty years of federal appellate court interpretation. The plain-
tiff ’s brief also developed a theme that Texas’s allocation of low income
housing tax credits impeded residents of racially segregated, economically
distressed areas from realizing the benefits of housing located in higher-
opportunity areas and thus of achieving the purpose of the FHA.
Citing legislative history accompanying the FHA, the ICP brief high-
lighted the detrimental impact and opportunity losses caused by residen-
tial segregation:
Segregated housing is deeply corrosive both for the individual and for his
community. It isolates racial minorities from the public life of the commu-
nity. It means inferior public education, recreation, health, sanitation, and
transportation services and facilities. It means denial of access to training
and employment and business opportunities. It prevents the inhabitants
of the ghettos from liberating themselves, and it prevents the Federal,
State, and local governments and private groups and institutions from ful-
filling their responsibilities and desire to help in this liberation. App. 48a
(U.S. Attorney General Katzenbach).20
After detailing the extent to which housing in Dallas had long been ra-
cially segregated, the brief challenged the allocation of LIHTC units by the
TDHCA as effectively reproducing the level of de jure racial segregation
that had existed in Dallas public housing. The brief pointed out that be-
tween 1994 and 2008 the number of affordable housing units in predom-
inantly minority census tracts had increased substantially while, at the
same time, majority-Caucasian Dallas suburbs developed with limited af-
fordable housing.21
The brief went on to explain that between 1995 to 2009, TDHCA did not
assign tax credits for any family units in predominantly white tracts in Dal-
las but allocated LIHTCs to units to be developed in locations reflecting
“ghetto conditions.”22 Further, it noted that the housing in Dallas offered
under Section 8 vouchers is principally sited in minority areas because
many property owners in largely Caucasian areas have declined to partic-
ipate in the voucher program. The net result has been to restrict housing
opportunities available in non-minority, higher-opportunity areas.23
The brief also contrasted ICP’s pro-integration argument with the con-
sequences of assigning tax credits to the project championed by Interve-
nor Frazier Revitalization, Inc. (FRI). The location of the FRI project was
described as high-crime and high-poverty (over 40 percent) with rising
unemployment and the absence of retail and other services.24 Apparently
20. Brief for Plaintiff-Respondent at 10.
21. Id. at 15.
22. Id. at 16.
23. Id. at 20.
24. Id. at 17. In its brief to the Court, Intervenor Frazier Revitalization, Inc. de-
scribed itself as a § 501(c)(3) nonprofit corporation constituted to help carry out a
neighborhood plan on a former public housing site, Frazier Courts, in South Dallas.
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drawing on these arguments, the Court’s opinion acknowledged the soci-
etal effects of racial segregation while offering a somewhat moderated
scope of effects-based liability.
B. The Court’s Response: Acceptance of the Pro-Integration
Argument—with Reservations
This section analyzes the Court’s complicated response to the argu-
ments developed by ICP and the federal government as amicus curiae, ar-
guing that the Court both accepted their reading of the purpose and con-
text of the Fair Housing Act while adopting a cautionary approach to its
application. Initially, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in ICP closely
followed the theory of the case developed on appeal in the briefs of ICP
and the Solicitor General. The Court addressed the impact of segregation
in its reference to the historical context in relation to which the Fair Hous-
ing Act was enacted.
In Part IB of the opinion, for example, the Court reviewed historic
markers of residential segregation in the United States and the discrimina-
tory practices that were at segregation’s core. The Court particularly
linked societal unrest in the 1960s to racially segregated housing patterns
and lack of equal access to housing,25 citing the 1968 Report on the National
Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (the Kerner Commission Report) for
its observations on the extent to which nonwhite families lived in racially
segregated, blighted urban areas and on a resulting “deepening racial di-
vision.”26 The Court further noted that, in the immediate aftermath of the
assassination of Dr. Marin Luther King, Jr., in April 1968, and in response
to the Kerner Commission proposals to adopt legislation banning discri-
mination and promoting racial integration in the sale and rental of hous-
ing, Congress enacted the Fair Housing Act.27
The Court returned to the issue of racial segregation in Part II of the
opinion, in identifying as part of the “heartland” cases, i.e., cases that di-
rectly implicate the concerns that the Fair Housing Act was enacted to
remedy, those practices, such as exclusionary zoning laws and bans on
the construction of multifamily housing, that restrict racial minorities’ ac-
cess to housing in particular neighborhoods.28 In addition to this discus-
sion, the Court’s pointed mention of the problem of “racial isolation” in
With substantial representation on its board by Frazier Courts residents as well as
members of the Dallas business community, FRI is tasked with acquiring blighted
properties and transferring them to developers to rehabilitate. These revitalization
projects are funded by low income housing tax credits. Brief of Respondent Frazier
Revitalization, Inc., in Support of Petitioners, at 1–2, Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty.
Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015).
25. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2516.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 2522.
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Part III of the opinion, echoing a reference at the conclusion of Part II,29
indicates a concern that a theory of disparate-impact liability be capacious
enough to protect against policies and practices that, in effect, continue to
codify the reality of segregated housing.
Specifically, the Court quoted Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Parents
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1,30 which dif-
fered in nuanced ways from the plurality’s concern in that case to limit
substantially the use of race-based remedies.31 In ICP, the Court quoted
Justice Kennedy’s reference in Parents Involved to the “historic commit-
ment to creating an integrated society” as justification for using appropri-
ate tools to combat actions that perpetuate racial segregation in housing.32
Nonetheless, the Court in ICP tempered statements that would other-
wise seem to embrace residential mobility as the key means to achieving
the goals of the Fair Housing Act. The Court went on to address the need
to recognize some limits on disparate-impact liability after canvassing
multiple factors supporting the interpretation that disparate-impact
claims are cognizable under the FHA: the statute’s results-oriented lan-
guage;33 the similar structure and language of two similarly aimed anti-
discrimination statutes, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act34 and the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act;35 the 1988 amendments to the FHA;36
and the purpose of the FHA.37
First, the Court noted “serious constitutional questions” if liability were
found only on the basis of a “statistical disparity” in the racial composition
of affordable housing developments.38 The Court also noted that, unlike the
‘heartland” disparate-impact cases combatting artificial and arbitrary im-
pediments to racially inclusive housing, the case at issue entailed a
“novel theory of liability,”39 that is, that assigning housing tax credits to de-
velop housing in a blighted area was inconsistent with the aims of the FHA
to achieve more widespread integration in housing.40 Instead, it is impor-
tant, the Court opined, to give ”leeway” to housing authorities and private
29. Id. at 2525.
30. 551 U.S. 701,789 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment).
31. Id. at 733, 748.
32. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2525 (quoting Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 797).
33. Id. at 2518–20.
34. Id. at 2516–18, discussing the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a)(2).
35. Id. at 2516–18, discussing Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 623(a)(2).
36. Id. at 2519–21.
37. Id. at 2521–22.
38. Id. at 2523.
39. Id. at 2522.
40. Id. at 2523.
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developers to demonstrate valid interests behind challenged policies, sim-
ilar to the business necessity defense allowed under Title VII.41 It would
be “paradoxical to construe the FHA to impose onerous costs on actors
who encourage revitalizing dilapidated housing in our Nation’s cities
merely because some other priority might seem preferable.”42
Referring to the risk that race-based considerations would be intro-
duced into every determination about housing, the Court stated that it
was necessary to insist on a “robust causality requirement” beyond a
showing of statistical disparity.43 The Court tied its argument for limiting
the scope of disparate-impact liability to the “artificial, arbitrary, and un-
necessary barriers” standard stated in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.44 The
Court observed that limiting the reach of disparate-impact liability
would also mitigate against the commencement of “abusive“ claims that
would have a chilling effect on the construction of affordable housing
and impair government efforts to enforce building and housing codes de-
signed to protect residents’ health and welfare.45 The Court further ex-
pressed concern that remedial orders adopt race-neutral means, avoiding
racial targets or quotas that could implicate “difficult constitutional
questions.”46
Yet even after invoking the need for limits, the Court acknowledged
that a reference to race in crafting remedies was not entirely foreclosed:
“local housing authorities may choose to foster diversity and combat ra-
cial isolation with race-neutral tools, and mere awareness of race in at-
tempting to solve the problems facing inner cities does not doom that en-
deavor at the outset.”47 And in concluding, the Court again cited the
Kerner Commission’s caution against societal segregation.
In sum, the opinion in ICP draws on the historic context of the Fair
Housing Act in interpreting it to encompass disparate-impact discrimina-
tion. Yet the Court’s policy-based concerns coupled with mention of con-
stitutional questions, presumably involving reference to race in designing
remedies, place limits on the ruling. Moreover, despite the Court’s refer-
ence to these limits as “cautionary standards” and ”safeguards” for inter-
preting the FHA, it seems fair to question how much guidance the Court
has in fact given for those seeking to invoke or implement its ruling. The
following section addresses this question in the context of a newly filed
lawsuit that asserts that the City of New York has engaged in both
41. Id. at 2522.
42. Id. at 2523.
43. Id.
44. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
45. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135
S. Ct. 2507, 2524 (2015).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 2525.
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intentional and disparate-impact discrimination in the lottery system in
effect for canvassing city residents’ applications for affordable housing.
III. Winfield v. City of New York: Using the Fair Housing
Act to Challenge Residential Segregation at
the Community District Level
Whether the ICP opinion affords adequate criteria for determining
when local governments and private developers merit leeway under the
FHA in deciding where to site affordable housing opportunities, or
whether the value of residential mobility is primary, must await the con-
tours of future claims. A lawsuit recently filed by the Anti-Discrimination
Center against the City of New York may afford such an opportunity. In
Winfield v. City of New York, the plaintiffs challenge an “outsider-
restriction” policy, a lottery system under which city residents eligible
to apply for affordable housing in the city are given preference with re-
spect to 50 percent of the units if they reside in the community district
in which the proposed housing will be located.48 As a consequence, resi-
dents living outside the community district who are otherwise eligible to
apply for affordable housing are prevented from competing for these
units on an equal basis.49 This section analyzes the theory of the lawsuit,
arguing that the claim falls squarely within the core concerns of the Fair
Housing Act and is also sufficiently distinguishable from the ICP facts
to suggest that the complaint will likely succeed in sidestepping the
Court’s limits and cautionary statements.
The three plaintiffs are African Americans residing in Manhattan,
Brooklyn, and Queens, who unsuccessfully applied via lottery for
affordable units in various developments located in majority-white com-
munity districts in Manhattan.50 The complaint alleges that the outsider-
restriction policy perpetuates residential racial segregation that exists
across the city, among the city’s fifty-nine community districts and
among households eligible to apply for affordable housing. The policy,
it is alleged, impairs mobility of city residents, particularly African
Americans and Latinos, who seek housing in higher-opportunity neigh-
borhoods, many of which are majority white, that afford superior
schools, health care, employment opportunities, parks, and lower
crime rates.51 The complaint also charges the city with intentional discri-
mination, alleging, among other grounds, that the outsider-restriction
policy was adopted with awareness of a history of residential segrega-
tion in the city, that the city rejected more integration-enhancing
48. Winfield v. City of New York, Case 1:15-cv-05236, Complaint ¶¶ 83–99
(S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2015).
49. Id. ¶¶ 100–26.
50. Id. ¶¶ 13–16.
51. Id. ¶ 7.
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approaches, and that it responded to “racially—and ethnically influ-
enced” political opposition.52
The complaint relies on a variety of statistical measures of racial dispar-
ity that merit discussion here. They include a “dissimilarity index,” which
quantifies the intensity of housing segregation.53 This index captures the
unevenness in distribution of two groups across “areal” units in a larger
area and is one of five recognized dimensions of segregation.54 Discussed
in various analyses of measuring residential segregation, this index was
noted in a widely cited 1955 sociological study of segregation indices by
Otis Dudley Duncan and Beverly Duncan and essentially validated in an
influential 1988 study by sociologists Douglas Benton and Nancy Massey.55
The complaint alleges that in 1980, among the largest U.S. cities, New
York was the second most segregated using the dissimilarity index mea-
sured between African Americans and whites, and that in 2010, New York
remained the second most segregated city with respect to this same dis-
similarity index.56 The complaint also alleges that in 1980, among the larg-
est cities, New York City was the fourth most segregated in a dissimilarity
index measured between Latinos and whites, and that in 2010, among the
largest cities, New York was the second most segregated according to the
Latino-white dissimilarity index.57
The lawsuit further charges that New York City is residentially segre-
gated at the community district level. Stating that the city’s African Amer-
ican population is approximately 22.8 percent according to the 2010 Cen-
sus,58 the complaint alleges that there is substantial disparity in the
distribution of African Americans among community districts; in seventeen
of the districts, African Americans comprise less than 5 percent of the pop-
ulation whereas in eleven other districts, African Americans comprise more
52. Id. ¶ 8.
53. Id. ¶ 34.
54. The others are exposure, clustering, concentration, and centralization. John
Iceland, Daniel H. Weinberg, and Erika Steinmetz, U.S. Census Bureau, Series
CENSR-3, Racial and Ethnic Residential Segregation in the United States: 1980-2000,
https://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/censr-3.pdf.
55. Id. The index computes the population of one of the two measured groups
in an areal unit, for example, a census tract, divides this figure by the size of the
group’s population in the larger area, obtains a similar calculation for the
second group in the study, calculates the difference between the measures for
the two groups, and then sums up the differences among all the areal units within
the larger area. University of Michigan Population Studies Center, Racial Residential
Segregation Measurement Project, Calculation Formula for Segregation Measures,
http://enceladus.isr.umich.edu/race/calculate.html.
56. Winfield v. City of New York, Case 1:15-cv-05236, Complaint ¶¶ 35–40
(S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2015).
57. Id. ¶¶ 41–46.
58. Id. ¶ 49.
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than 50 percent, and in six districts exceed 65 percent of the population.59
To gauge the significance of the disparity between community district
and citywide percentage of the group, the complaint also refers to “relative
difference,” consisting of the difference between the citywide percentage
and the community district percentage, divided by the citywide percent-
age.60 The complaint explains that relative difference puts the scope of
the difference in a context.61 Applying this measure, the complaint alleges
that in forty-two community districts, the relative difference between city-
wide and community district African American populations was 50 percent
or more.62 The complaint alleges a citywide Latino population based on the
2010 Census of approximately 28.6 percent,63 with ten districts having La-
tino populations of less than 10 percent, twelve districts with more than 50
percent, of which nine had greater than 60 percent.64 In thirty-three dis-
tricts, the relative difference between citywide and community district per-
centages of the Latino population is 50 percent or more.65
In another comparative measure of residential segregation at the com-
munity district level, the complaint focuses on differences among house-
holds earning various percentages of Area Median Income, an important
Department of Housing and Urban Development-developed gauge of el-
igibility for various categories of affordable housing.66 According to the
59. Id. ¶¶ 50–51.
60. Id. ¶ 52.
61. Id. at n.3. This calculation, as the complaint explains, gauges the percentage
relationship between the citywide-district difference and the smaller of the two
numbers in the calculation of difference. Id. The complaint offers the following ex-
planation and example, stating that if one
[o]nly looked at a percentage-point difference, one would not be able to determine
the significance of a particular percentage-point different. Take, for example, vari-
ances between two pairs of numbers. In each pair, the percentage-point difference
is nine points. In the first pair, the difference is between 1 percent and 10 percent.
In the second pair, the difference is between 50 percent and 59 percent. In the first
example, the nine percentage- point difference is nine times (or 900 percent) greater
than the smaller of the two numbers; in the second example, the same nine
percentage-point difference is only 18 percent greater than the smaller of the
two numbers. It is relative difference that puts the scope of a variation in context.
Id. (emphasis in original).
62. Id. ¶ 53.
63. Id. ¶ 54.
64. Id. ¶¶ 55–56.
65. Id. ¶ 57.
66. At the federal level, the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) refers to the median income for families in metropolitan and non-metropol-
itan areas to determine eligibility for a number of housing programs. HUD first sets
an area median family income in a given year and takes family size into account,
presenting family incomes as a percentage of the area median income. Florida
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complaint, significant differences exist in most community districts be-
tween the percentage of households within a given income eligibility
range who are African American or Latino and the citywide percentages
of households in that income range who are African American or Latino.67
In a fourth effort to gauge the extent of residential segregation, the
complaint examines where 50 percent of the citywide population of
major racial groups reside. Drawing on 2010 Census data, the complaint
notes that approximately 50 percent of Latinos in New York City live in
about 25 percent of the city’s community districts, approximately 50 per-
cent of whites live in fewer than 25 percent of the city’s community dis-
tricts, approximately 50 percent of Asians live in 17 percent of the city’s
community districts, and approximately 50 percent of African Americans
live in 15 percent of the city’s community districts.68 In effect, the smaller
the percentages of community districts, the greater the degree of residen-
tial concentration. The complaint further alleges that all community dis-
tricts “at least in part” have been affected by past intentional and
disparate-impact segregation-perpetuating policies.69
Turning to the specific basis for its challenge, the complaint describes the
origins and development of the outsider-restriction policy. First adopted in
1988 as a preference accorded for 30 percent of the affordable housing units
for residents of the community district in which the units were being
built,70 the percentage was increased to 50 percent in 2002 and remains at
that level.71 The complaint also points out that the preference accorded res-
idents of community districts does not depend on their length of residence
within the district and thus cannot be justified on the basis of long-time in-
volvement in a particular neighborhood.72 The complaint connects these
data to its overarching legal theory: that given the existing residential seg-
regation among community districts, the outsider-restriction policy perpet-
uates segregation in New York City neighborhoods, including those located
in majority-white community districts of opportunity such as those in
which the plaintiffs had applied for housing.73
Housing Data Clearinghouse, Improving Housing Decisions, http://flhousingdata.
shimberg.ufl.edu/apps/azindex.pl?t=18.
67. Winfield v. City of New York, Case 1:15-cv-05236, Complaint ¶¶ 61–76
(S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2015).
68. Id. ¶ 76.
69. Id. ¶ 77.
70. Id. ¶ 81.
71. ¶¶ 83–87. The policy provides that applicants for 38 percent of affordable
units have equal access to units via the lottery, id. ¶ 88, that city employees be
given preference to 5 percent of the units, mobility-impaired applicants receive
a preference for 5 percent of the units, and applicants with hearing or visual def-
icits, preference for 2 percent of the units, id. ¶ 89.
72. Id. ¶¶ 92–95.
73. Id. ¶¶ 100–01.
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In alleging the city’s awareness of the impact of residential segregation
on access to opportunity,74 the complaint refers to the city’s actual or con-
structive knowledge of studies demonstrating the effects on children who
mature in high-poverty, low-opportunity neighborhoods,75 areas marked
by inferior schools and health care, higher concentrations of environmen-
tal risk, and higher crime rates.76 Similarly, the complaint refers to the
city’s actual or constructive knowledge of studies that demonstrate the ad-
vantages to children born to low-income families who are able to move to
higher-opportunity neighborhoods.77 Although the studies are unnamed
in the complaint, recent social science research provides compelling sup-
port for the complaint’s linking of children’s opportunities with the de-
gree to which they live in high- or low-poverty areas. In particular, a note-
worthy 2104 study by Raj Chetty and his research associates explores the
spatial dimensions of intergenerational mobility, identifying variations in
mobility based on geographic areas.78
Analyzing the probability that a child born to a family in the bottom
fifth of the national income distribution will ascend to the top fifth of
that same distribution, the study found notable differences, ranging
from a probability of 12.9 percent in San Jose, California, to 4.4 percent
in Charlotte, North Carolina.79 The study analyzes five “factors” that
are “strongly” correlated with geographic variations in upward mobility:
residential segregation, income inequality, strength of local schools, social
capital such as participation in community networks, and family structure
(one versus two parents).80 Building on research that analyzed ways in
which segregation impairs life opportunities, including lack of access to
successful role models, well-funded schools, or employment, the Chetty
study found an inverse correlation between racially segregated areas
and upward mobility.81
74. Id. ¶¶ 112–17.
75. Id. ¶ 118.
76. Id. ¶ 117.
77. Id. ¶120.
78. Raj Chetty, Nathaniel Hendren, Patrick Kline & Emmanuel Saez, Where Is
the Land of Opportunity? The Geography of Intergenerational Mobility in the United
States, 129(4) Q.J. ECON. 1553–1623 (2014), available at http://www.equality-of-
opportunity.org/images/mobility_geo.pdf.
79. Id. at 26–27 (http://www.equality-of-opportunity.org/images/mobility_
geo.pdf).
80. Id. at 3, 34–42.
81. Id. at 34–35. This study is also usefully discussed in Malcolm Gladwell,
Starting Over, NEW YORKER, Aug. 24, 2015, at 32–37 (examining how decisions
whether to relocate away from New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina affected the
life circumstances of persons dispossessed by the storm). Another recent Chetty
study relevant to the theory of both ICP and Winfield analyzed experimental data
involving randomly chosen families who were given housing vouchers that
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Other research based on analyses of U.S. Census data indicates that the
concentration of people in the United States living in high-poverty areas—
located in census tracts in which 40 percent or more of the residents have
incomes lower than the federal poverty level—increased from 7.2 million
in 2000 to 13.8 million in 2013.82 In cities with the highest incidence of
poverty, large percentages of minority populations lived in these
poverty-concentrated areas.83 This development reversed the improve-
ments noted in the decade between 1990 and 200084 and is evidence
both of the persistence and spatial concentration of poverty, the problem
that the FHA was enacted in part to combat.
The Winfield case, unlike ICP, does not involve a challenge to the
locations where affordable housing is being built or financed, that is, it
does not implicate a city’s locational choice between siting housing in a
high-opportunity neighborhood or a project of “revitalization” in a
higher-poverty area. Nor does it challenge the use of low-income housing
tax credits to favor projects in locations having a high concentration of
low-income, minority residents.85 In this respect, the theory of theWinfield
complaint is distinguishable from the plaintiffs’ disparate-impact
theory in ICP, which alleged that Texas’s allocation of tax credits was
segregation-reinforcing, perpetuating racially concentrated housing pat-
terns and impairing opportunities that could lead to increased racial
and economic integration.
allowed them to move from a high-poverty area to a better-resourced neighbor-
hood. The data demonstrated that moving to a higher opportunity neighborhood
improved educational and employment outcomes for children of these families
who were under thirteen when the families moved. Raj Chetty, Nathaniel Hendren
& Lawrence F. Katz, The Effects of Exposure to Better Neighborhoods on Children: New
Evidence for the Moving to Opportunity Experiment, available at http://www.equality-
of-opportunity.org/images/mto_paper.pdf (May 2015). (Thanks are due to
Stephen Miller’s discussion, The neighborhood matters, it turns out, but for tomorrow
more than today, LAND USE PROF BLOG (Aug. 21, 2015), http://lawprofessors.
typepad.com/land_use/2015/08/the-neighborhood-matters-one-generation-later.
html, for bringing Gladwell’s article and Chetty’s research to my attention.)





Foundation Fellow Paul Jargowsky’s review of federal census data in The
Architecture of Segregation: Civil Unrest, the Concentration of Poverty, and Public




85. Winfield v. City of New York, Case 1:15-cv-05236, Complaint ¶¶ 107–09
(S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2015).
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Rather, the Winfield complaint focuses attention on a policy restricting
the ability of some city residents to be considered for available affordable
housing developments based on the community district in which they
live, arguing that this restricted access reinforces the impact of residential
segregation on low-income persons of color. It links the elimination of the
outsider-restriction policy with enhancing the values of residential choice
and mobility-to-opportunity. To the extent that it emphasizes these val-
ues, the complaint invokes the broad remedial purpose of the Fair Hous-
ing Act and the ICP Court’s connection of that purpose with its acknowl-
edgment that the Act reaches disparate–impact discrimination.86
In its motion to dismiss, the city as expected reaffirmed its long-held
outsider restriction policy (although it argued that a state real property
tax law actually required community preference for the projects at
issue). In a previously released press statement, New York City Mayor
de Blasio had described the lottery as a “very balanced plan” allowing
“people who are part of a neighborhood [to] have an opportunity to access
affordable housing in that neighborhood.”87 Thus, the caveats and caution
expressed in the ICP opinion that potentially limit its usefulness as a pre-
cedent will likely be tested in the Winfield litigation. For example, in com-
menting on the ICP complaint’s “novel theory of liability,” the Court ob-
served that on remand the case “may be seen simply as an attempt to
second-guess which of two reasonable approaches a housing authority
should follow in the sound exercise of its discretion in allocating tax cred-
its for low-income housing.”88 If the Court is suggesting that developing
blighted, racially segregated neighborhoods is an approach equally rea-
sonable to one promoting residential mobility and integration, it is not
86. Gesturing toward the broader, thematic connections between the ICP and
Winfield suits, The Anti-Discrimination Center’s website highlights a supportive
quotation from Elizabeth Julian, president of The Inclusive Communities Project:
The fundamental theme of ADC’s lawsuit is that there is no acceptable type or
scope of housing segregation. That stance upsets lots of people who, for various
reasons, support the segregated status quo. But it’s the only stance compatible
with a vision of a just society, and it is why ADC’s lawsuit against New York
City’s outsider-restriction policy needs to be supported by civil rights advocates
and their allies all across the country.
Anti-Discrimination Center, Support for the Challenge to NYC’s Outsider-Restriction
Policy, http://www.antibiaslaw.com/article/support-challenge-nycs-outsider-
restriction-policy (last visited Oct. 3, 2015).
87. Telephone communication with plaintiffs’ attorney Craig Gurian, Anti-
Discrimination Center (Sept. 1, 2015). See also Sally Goldenberg, DeBlasio Defends
Housing-Lottery Policy Amid Legal Challenge, POLITICO ( July 13, 2015, 3:31 PM),
http://www.capitalnewyork.com/article/city-hall/2015/07/8571958/de-blasio-
defends-housing-lottery-policy-amid-legal-challenge.
88. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135
S. Ct. 2507, 2522 (2015).
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evident that the ICP opinion is a strong or clear precedent favoring use of
the FHA to encourage racial and economic integration.
To be sure, both cases are animated by a concern for mobility, affording
access, in the words of Chetty and his associates, to the “land of opportu-
nity.” However, it is not even clear from the Court’s opinion that the com-
plaint’s allegations in ICP relating to limits on residential mobility would
qualify as disparate-impact discrimination. The Court hinted that, on re-
mand, the complaint might not meet a “robust causality requirement,”
which, to avoid “serious Constitutional questions,” the Court averred,
must be based on more than statistical disparity in the racial composition
of housing developments.89
InWinfield, the ICP Court’s concern that causality be demonstrated inde-
pendently of a statistical disparity would have to be addressed. As noted,
the Winfield complaint offers various statistical showings of over- and
under-representation of minority racial and ethnic groups in particular
community districts. However, the challenge made to the lottery system
is rooted not in population statistics per se but rather in the concern to elim-
inate an explicitly preferential policy among applicants, which may prove
to be a helpful point of differentiation. Moreover, the relief plaintiffs seek
does not entail the imposition of racial targets or quotas, another concern
of the ICP Court, but as noted requests the elimination of preferences
(based on residency in a community district). Further, the absence of a ra-
tionale for according preferences merely by virtue of residing in a commu-
nity district and the availability of an in-district preference without any con-
sideration of longevity of residence90 weigh in the plaintiffs’ favor. The
plaintiffs can argue that removing the lottery preferences would count as
dismantling “artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers” to desirable
housing, a touchstone in Griggs that the ICP Court also embraced.91
As the disparate-impact case theory of Winfield is developed,92 a key
consideration will be the ability to sidestep ICP’s rationales for limiting
89. Id. at 2522–23.
90. Winfield v. City of New York, Complaint ¶¶ 92–95.
91. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2524.
92. In addition to the complaint’s disparate-impact cause of action under the
FHA, it alleges the city’s violation of the disparate-impact provisions of the city’s
Human Rights Law, which may be shown where
(1) . . . a policy or practice of a covered entity or a group of policies or practices
of a covered entity results in a disparate impact to the detriment of any group
protected by the provisions of this chapter; and (2) the covered entity fails to
plead and prove as an affirmative defense that each such policy or practice
bears a significant relationship to a significant business objective of the covered
entity or does not contribute to the disparate impact.
N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(17)(a)(1)(2).
The statute also provides that
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disparate-impact liability. As noted above, the context of the Winfield suit
is sufficiently distinguishable from ICP that it seems fair to assume that it
can avoid conflict with ICP’s cautionary reservations. If the lawsuit can in-
stead be situated in the ”heartland” of FHA’s historical context and pur-
pose, considerations that the ICPmajority recognized as crucial, the case is
more likely to survive the motion stage and afford an opportunity to test
whether FHA disparate-impact liability post-ICPwill realize the racial jus-
tice concerns at the statute’s core.
[t]he mere existence of a statistical imbalance between a covered entity’s chal-
lenged demographic composition and the general population is not alone
sufficient to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact violation unless
the general population is shown to be the relevant pool for comparison, the im-
balance is shown to be statistically significant and there is an identifiable policy
or practice or group of policies or practices that allegedly causes the imbalance.
N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(17)(b).
A recent amendment to the city’s Human Rights Law, the Local Civil Rights
Restoration Act, adopted by the New York City Council in 2005, was intended
to ensure that the Human Rights Law would be interpreted broadly and “indepen-
dently from similar or identical provisions of New York state or federal statutes.”
Craig Gurian, A Return to the Eyes on the Prize: Litigating Under the Restored New York
City Human Rights Law, 33 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 255, 256 (2006), quoting N.Y.C. Local
Law No. 85 of 2005, § 1 (Oct. 3, 2005). Although analysis of the plaintiffs’ cause of
action under the City’s Human Rights Law is beyond the scope of this article, the
statute is potentially a promising vehicle for relief, in light of the stated intent not to
replicate federal law but to provide a potentially greater source of rights.
Winfield v. City of New York: The Limits of Disparate-Impact Liability 303

